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Abstract. Despite the growth of the Internet and the increasing con-
cern for privacy of online communications, current deployments of anon-
ymization networks depend on a very small set of nodes that volunteer
their bandwidth. We believe that the main reason is not disbelief in
their ability to protect anonymity, but rather the practical limitations in
bandwidth and latency that stem from limited participation. This limited
participation, in turn, is due to a lack of incentives to participate. We
propose providing economic incentives, which historically have worked
very well.
In this paper, we demonstrate a payment scheme that can be used to
compensate nodes which provide anonymity in Tor, an existing onion
routing, anonymizing network. We show that current anonymous pay-
ment schemes are not suitable and introduce a hybrid payment system
based on a combination of the Peppercoin Micropayment system and a
new type of “one use” electronic cash. Our system claims to maintain
users’ anonymity, although payment techniques mentioned previously –
when adopted individually – provably fail.
1 Introduction
Anonymous networking has been known since 1981 [1]. A more prac-
tical scheme, Onion Routing, was first described in 1995 [2]. Currently
there is little practical use of network anonymity systems. Some of the
problem is undoubtedly sociological: most people do not feel the need to
protect their privacy that way; this is one reason that companies such
as Zero Knowledge Systems [3, 4] and Digicash [5] failed. Another prob-
lem, though, is that strong anonymity against traffic analysis requires
cooperation by and implicit trust in many different parties. Any single
entity, no matter how trustworthy it appears, can be subverted, whether
by technical means, corrupt personnel, or so-called “subpoena attacks”.
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All known solutions require, and in fact enforce, routing through multiple
parties. This, though, introduces another problem: economic incentives.
In a single-provider anonymity scheme, that problem is conceptually sim-
ple: the party desiring privacy pays a privacy provider. This payment
can be protected by digital cash [6]. Unfortunately, in a multi-provider
Mixnet or onion routing network, the problem is more complex, since each
party must be paid. By examining existing digital cash schemes, we show
that they do not provide the necessary cost or privacy properties required
to maintain anonymity. For example, in Chaum’s original e-cash scheme
[6] a double-spender’s identity is exposed. This is perfectly acceptable –
double-spending is a form of cheating that should be punished – but in
the context of an onion routing network, detecting double spending gives
an adversary clues to path setup.
To address these problems, we propose a novel hybrid payment scheme
by combining features from Micali’s micropayment system [7] and a light-
weight, blind signature-based e-cash scheme. Our goal is to create incen-
tives for the network participants to act in a cooperative manner based on
their personal interests. We show that any solution must be sound in sev-
eral dimensions. First, it must protect privacy. This is not trivial; witness
the many (partial) attacks on various anonymous networking protocols
[8, 9]. That said, we do not claim to have fixed those problems. Rather,
our aim is avoid introducing any new vulnerabilities that stem from the
payments scheme.
Second, we want a system that is in principle deployable. That is,
though we assume such things as anonymous payment systems, we do
not assume, for example, incorruptible banks. More importantly, we want
a system that is compatible with known economic behavior. Therefore,
while our system assumes that people are willing to pay for privacy, we
want a system where customer payment – the profits of forwarding nodes
– are related to privacy desired and effort expended. In essence, there
must be a profit motive and the opportunity for market forces to work.
To deter exploitation of the payment scheme, we provide mechanisms to
detect cheaters: those parties who accept payment but do not provide
services.
Third, we do not attempt to achieve absolute financial security. In-
stead, we are willing to accept small amounts of cheating, by senders or
forwarders, as long as the amount is bounded and limited (possibly with
some trade-off) by the party who is exposed to loss. Finally, we want
a system that is acceptably efficient in practice and does not impose
unreasonable resource consumption. To that end, we evaluate the oper-
ations of a prototype PAR – which stands for Payment for Anonymous
Routing. Our initial performance evaluation indicates that PAR is highly
configurable and can operate with acceptable communication and CPU
overhead. As opposed to previous work on incentivised anonymity, which
used mixnets ([10], [11], [12]), our system guarantees usable efficiency,
accountability and maintains anonymity against traffic analysis attacks.
2 System Considerations
We will examine current anonymizing networks and payment schemes
and show why current payment schemes, when applied to onion rout-
ing schemes, fail to maintain anonymizing network properties, while our
hybrid scheme succeeds. Furthermore, we set up the threat model and
we identify the individual components and the properties required by a
payment scheme to provide the same protection the network anonymity
















Fig. 1. The PAR architecture combines an onion routing anonymity network (Tor)
with a payment scheme. Each node T1, T2, T3, · · · , TL, where L is the path length, in
the path from the sender to the receiver receives payment in coins for its service.
Anonymizing Network. An anonymizing network is a particular
type of peer-to-peer network, in which peers communicate anonymously.
Anonymizing networks aim to offer sender anonymity even against the
recipient as well as sender-receiver unlinkability. Neither the recipient
nor any other participant should be able to detect the actual sender with
a better probability than selecting the sender at random. As a proof of
concept, we use Tor [13], the second generation onion routing anonymity
network, a well-known and deployed network anonymity system.
Adversarial Model. The participating entities of our system are
the Tor relays, the outside users, and a clearance entity, i.e. a Bank,
where monetary units are deposited/withdrawn. We inherit Tor’s local
adversary model where users can only observe the traffic going through
them and a limited amount of the rest of the network traffic. In addition,
we assume that malicious users can manipulate any packet going through
them and use this information to compromise anonymity. The Bank, on
the other hand is assumed “honest but curious”. Therefore, although
trusted to be honest in all of its functional operations – cash withdraw and
deposit – the Bank can collaborate with any number of users in order to
disclose the initiator of a communication or active communication paths.
We do not consider covert channels for anonymous communication with
routers without paying as a part of our threat model.
System Requirements. Our primary requirement is that the overall
system should maintain the anonymity provided by Tor even when the
payment deposit information is exposed to a third party including the
Bank. Anonymity, however, should not be achieved at the expense of
efficiency. Moreover, the payment scheme should meet the requirement
necessary for any payment system such as accountability, correctness,
and robustness.
Payment Analysis. For our analysis, we classify current payment
schemes in two categories: Identity-bound payments and Anonymous pay-
ments. In Figure 1, the sender provides payment for all nodes T1, T2, T3,
· · · , TL3 that forward the sender’s traffic to the receiver. We will show
that both of the current payment schemes, when applied to a Tor network,
render the anonymity system vulnerable to attacks that compromise the
anonymity of the senders.
Identity-bound Payment Schemes. Identity-bound payments consti-
tute signed endorsements from the payer to the payee. Accountability
and robustness are the two main features of this class. The micropay-
ment scheme [7] is an example of an Identity-bound payment. It was
designed to be efficient for small, online transactions. When used to pay
Tor nodes, identity-bound payments provide immediate accountability
because invalid payments from any entity can be easily accounted for.
However, when applied in the context of the Tor network, this property
has adverse implications: upon clearance, the Bank obtains global knowl-
3 In Tor, intermediate communication path nodes are chosen randomly by the com-
munication initiator.
edge about all transactions in the anonymity network. If the sender uses
his own coins to pay the nodes in the path, his identity is exposed to
them. Therefore, any node in the path to the receiver can identify him
with the help of the Bank. To make things worse, the last node in the path
– who may suspect that he is the last node if the receiver is outside Tor –
can link the sender to the receiver. A potential way to work around this
problem is to distribute payments only to immediate neighbors. With this
payment strategy, the sender pays TL with L coins, TL pays TL−1 with
L−1 coins etc. This approach makes path tracing much harder and leaks
less information but it is far from secure: deposits made by the sender
to the first Tor node are still available to the Bank. Counting the coins
bound to the sender’s identity, the Bank can infer with high confidence
the number of packets communicated to the sender and link the sender
to the receiver. This analysis indicates that having identity-bound coins
reveals too much information, enabling an adversary with access to pay-
ment information to break the system’s anonymity using simple inference
techniques.
Anonymous Payment Schemes. In this scheme, the payment does not
carry any identification information of its initial owner. Chaum’s Digital
cash [6] and the later versions [14–16] of Tunstall et al. and Camenisch et
al. are perfect examples of such anonymous payment schemes. In the
general case of digital cash systems, a user withdraws money from a
Bank, which he can only spend himself and which when legally spent
can never be linked to his identity. Merchants deposit the coins they have
received to check whether any of them has been spent more times than its
nominal value (double-spending). If the later occurs, the identity of the
double-spender is revealed. However, all the anonymous payment schemes
demand excessive communication overhead for each transaction because
there are a lot of messages that need to be exchanged between the sender
and the path nodes.4 This requirement makes e-cash schemes impractical
for our system.
An alternative solution would be for all users to withdraw a special
kind of anonymous coin from the Bank, which can simply be Bank blind
endorsements [17], and use these coins to pay the intermediate Tor nodes.
Ideal as it might initially seem, using a completely anonymous payment
scheme with Tor has its drawbacks. First of all, there is no immediate ac-
countability, since double-spending in this case will not reveal the double-
4 In the compact e-cash payment scheme [16], which is considered efficient a single
“spend” procedure in e-cash systems would requires at least two rounds of message
exchange between the sender and every node in the path.
spender. Thus, to prevent double-spending, any payments received should
be immediately checked and deposited in the Bank. Unfortunately, im-
mediate coin deposits could lead to deposit timing attacks exposing Tor’s
anonymity. More specifically, the timing of deposits by the nodes along
a Tor path discloses to the Bank the path as well as an estimated of
the number of packets transferred. Accumulating deposits for appropri-
ately long time intervals – sufficiently long that many connections are
established, to mitigate timing attacks – would increase the amount of
unchecked coins and thus of double-spending. Indeed, since anonymous
coins are not traceable beyond the first Tor node, sending valid coins only
to the first node is enough to prevent it from been traced. For the rest
of the nodes, the cheater uses double-spent coins, exploiting this deposit
strategy by transmitting many packets in a short period of time.
Our Contribution: Hybrid Approach. Both of the two aforementioned
classes of payment schemes have advantages and disadvantages. Our ap-
proach creates a hybrid payment scheme by combining the two payments
methods into a single one. In particular, nodes outside the anonymizing
network withdraw an initial number of anonymous coins (A-mcoins) from
the Bank and use them to pay the first node in the Tor-path (TL) they
have chosen. TL then uses micropayments5 to pay TL−1, who also uses
micropayments to pay its neighbor. Each time, the amount of money paid
decreases according to each node’s price. Nodes participating in the Tor
network follow the same protocol with the option to use either anonymous
or micropayments for the first node in their forwarding path.
In addition, each of the payment coins in the scheme has a corre-
sponding receipt and becomes valid only when it is submitted for deposit
together with the receipt. As we will show in the following sections, our
payment scheme combines all the desirable properties of the existing pay-
ment schemes, but without maintaining any of the problem each one of
them causes when used individually and in this way it provides sender-
receiver unlinkability along with accountability and efficiency.
3 High-Level Description of PAR Protocol
Here we provide a high-level description of our payment scheme. To help
the reader, we start with a brief description of the Tor circuit setup; we
then present our payment scheme.
5 Identity-bound payment
3.1 Tor
Tor is formed by a set of relay nodes (onion routers) that act as traf-
fic indirection points. The region in the dotted lines in Figure 1 de-
picts a typical communication in Tor. Each onion router maintains a
TLS [18] connection to every other onion router. To establish communi-
cation, the sender selects a random sequence of Tor relays to form a path
to the receiver or what is called a circuit. In Figure 1, the sender selected
nodes T1, T2, T3, · · ·TL, where L is the path length. The sender constructs
circuits incrementally, by negotiating a symmetric key with each onion
router on the path, one hop at a time. Initially, the sender contacts the
first path node, TL, and they both commit in a Diffie Hellman (DH) key
agreement procedure. Once this initial circuit has been created, sender
uses TL to extend the circuit to TL−1. In particular, TL and TL−1 estab-
lish a circuit – through the TLS channel they share – which TL relates
to the one with the sender. Sender commits anonymously (using TL as
mediator) in a Diffie Hellman (DH) key exchange procedure with TL−1.
Repeating this process through the extended tunnel, the sender may add
more Tor nodes to the circuit. At the final stage, the last node in the path,
T1, opens a data stream with the receiver and a regular TCP connection
is established between the sender and the remote site’s IP address. At the
end of the circuit setup procedure, every relay in the path shares a secret
key with the anonymous path initiator, as well as with each of his path
neighbors. The key a path node shares with each of his neighbors is only
used for securing their part in the communication path. Each transmitted
Tor message along a path, contains an unencrypted header with a circuit
ID and a multiply-encrypted payload. At each hop, the corresponding
path node decrypts the payload – using the key that node and the sender
share – and replaces the circuit ID with the one that corresponds to his
circuit with next node in the path.
3.2 PAR
We introduce the hybrid payment scheme from the previous section to the
Tor network; again, see Figure 1. In our scheme, payments are conducted
between consecutive nodes on the forwarding paths and added inside the
transmitted messages using an additional encryption layer. Each forward-
ing node Ti creates payment coins for its path successor Ti−1 using sender
S’s directions and adds these payment coins to the onion message to be
forwarded to Ti−1. Payment information is provided to each Ti through
the secret channel it and the sender share. To avoid exposure as in Tor,
Ti further encrypts the resulting message with the key it shares with its
successor. To complete the payment transaction and for the coins to be-
come valid, every relay node has to receive the receipts for its payment by
its successor. Therefore, each node, other than the last one, upon validat-
ing the received message, sends to its predecessor the payment receipt. S
controls the payments made along the forwarding path by supplying the
receipts for all the coins used.
To avoid cheating, S provides each path node Ti with additional in-
formation for it to verify that the payment received from Ti+1 is indeed
valid. Receipts are forwarded to Ti+1 if and only if the the payments
are valid. Since the circuit is used in both directions (i.e. to both re-
ceive and transmit messages, the last node can either be pre-paid or paid
after the delivery of the message by the sender depending on the accept-
able bounded risk. In either approach misbehaving nodes will be detected
within the first round of sent messages and will be excluded from the for-
warding path, which will cause them more loss than the expected gain
from fraudulent behavior and they will have no incentive for cheating.
The initial setup stage for Tor circuits will be extended with nodes
sharing some hash function that will be used prevent third party manip-
ulations in the payment protocol.
4 A Hybrid Payment Scheme
In this section, we present a detailed description of our payment protocol.
However, before proceeding, we first define three properties required to
preserve anonymity in an onion routing network:
Sender-Receiver Unlinkability. Let S be a user, who may or may not
be a member of the anonymizing network, who sends a messageM anony-
mously6 to a user R. Then nobody except a global adversary, even with
the collaboration of a third party and R, should be able to link sender
and receiver or reveal the path between them.
Usable Efficiency. This refers to the fact that the overhead in the packet
exchange for the payment scheme and the CPU overload with additional
cryptographic operations will be reasonable and will not impede the nor-
mal functioning of the system.
Accountability. This property ensures that any cheating node trying
to forge messages or double-spend coins is caught and expelled from the
network.
6 Here, “anonymously” means “using the anonymizing network”.
4.1 Payment Coins
We use two types of payments that consist of two parts: a payment part,
which we will call a coin, and a receipt part. A coin becomes valid only
when it is accompanied by the corresponding receipt. The receipt is a
random number that is bound to the coin by incorporating its hash value
in the coin. Thus a random number r serves as a receipt for the coin
that contains the hash H(r). Although similar in structure, the two types
of payments have different properties and that is why they are named
differently: micro-coins (S-coins) and anonymous coins (A-coins).
S-coins(Signed microcoins). S-coins are generated and used for pay-
ments between Tor participants. They are based on the micropayments
introduced in [7] but with the addition of receipts. An S-coin is an exten-
sion of a microcoin MC :
SCTi→Tj = sigTi{MC,H(r), Tj}.
As in the microcoin case, an S-coin is strongly bound to both the
identity of the node Ti, who generates it by signing its content, and the
identity of the payee Tj . Finally, it contains the hash of the receipt H(r)
that makes the coin valid. The microcoin part of the S-coin MC contains
the transaction details τ as well as a sequence number – according to
micropayment scheme [7] – without containing any timing information.
S-coins inherit the properties of microcoins. Only a predetermined
fraction of them are payable, while no participants in the payment scheme
can find out in advance which coins will become payable.
A-coins (Anonymous coins). A-coins use the idea of e-cash ([6]). They
are generated by the Bank upon users’ requests. Users outside Tor buy a
predetermined number of A-coins from the Bank and pay with them for
using the anonymizing network. Members of Tor also acquire a number
of A-coins and may also use them. All A-coins are of the form
AC(r) = sigB{r},
where r is a random number generated by the User, and sigB{r} is the
blind signature of the Bank of r. A-coins are all payable and subjected to
double-spending checks.
4.2 Payment Protocol
Figure 2 presents in detail the messages exchanged in the payment pro-
tocol. We further analyze the individual protocol stages.
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Fig. 2. The intuition behind our payment protocol is that Tor participants use S-coins
to avoid exposing the forwarding path; outside senders, by contrast, use A-coins to
maintain their anonymity.
Initial Set-up All nodes participating in Tor acquire a public-private
signature key pair (sksU , pk
s
U) and a public-private encryption key pair
(skeU , pk
e
U), used to interact with the other members in the network.
Bank generates a blind signature key pair (skbB, pk
b
B) for signing A-coins.
In addition to the hash H already used in Tor for integrity purposes,
we establish another collision resistant hash function Hr for the coins’
receipts. At the end of the circuit setup procedure in Tor, the sender
shares with each node Ti in the path a secret key KSTi while any two
consecutive nodes in a path share a secret key KTiTi+1 . In our system, the
sender agrees with each path node on a hash function HSTi . The shared
keys are used for communication encryption whereas the hash functions
for integrity checks. We use Mk to denote message M encrypted under
key K; sigUM is the signature of user U on M .
Payment Generation A-coins are generated in cooperation with the
Bank. When user U wants to obtain A-coins for payment, he gener-
ates a fixed set of random numbers r1, r2, . . . , rn, which serve as the
receipts for the coins. Then, the user submits to the Bank the hashes
Hr(r1),Hr(r2), . . . ,Hr(rn) which in turn signs them and generates coins
of the form:
ACi = sigB(Hr(ri)).
The resulting A-coins can be used for payment to any node in the network.
In the case of S-coins, users can generate them but they have to spec-
ify the payee. When user U wants to pay a node Ti with an S-coin, he
generates the random number receipt r and its microcoin-like part MC
which consists of a number that increases by one per S-coin payed by U
to Ti and no timing information at all. The final form of the S-coin is:
SCU→Ti(r) = sigU (MC,Hr(r), Ti).
Communication Protocol Description Let S send to R a messageM
through the path T`, . . . , T1. The following sequence of payments occurs
for the transfer of the message:
– S pays T` ` coins, which may be A-coins or S-coins. Nodes outside
Tor can only pay by A-coins while Tor nodes can use either type of
coin.
– each node Ti+1 on the forwarding path pays its successor Ti i S-coins.
The sender S chooses the receipts that will be used by the nodes on the
path to generate payments for their successors. It also sends proofs to
each of the nodes Ti in the form Hr(r1), . . . ,Hr(ri) where r1, . . . , ri will
be the receipts for the coins the node will get from its predecessor.
A node Ti+1 gets the receipt for its payment coins from its successor
Ti on the path.
Exchanged Messages The general form of the message that a node Ti+1
sends to a node Ti on the forwarding path between sender and receiver is
the following:
( {Ti, coins for Ti, sigTi+1{H(coins for Ti)}, {MS→Ti}KSTi}KTi+1Ti )
– Ti specifies the receiver of the message
– “coins for Ti” is the payment the node gets for forwarding the packet.
The coins here are either A-coins if the sender was an outside node
and Ti is the first node in the path, or S-coins of the form SCTi+1→Ti
– sigTi+1{H(coins for Ti)} is mainly needed in the case of A-coins7 and
serves accountability purposes when double-spending has been de-
tected and
– {MS→Ti}KSTi is the part of the onion message from the sender that
has to be read by Ti.
7 it can be eliminated in the case of S-coins
Now consider the last part of the message MS→Ti , which has the
following form:
( Ti−1, Ti+1 receipt, payment guarantee for Ti,
values for generation of coins for Ti−1, {MS→Ti−1}KSTi−1 )
– Ti−1 is the successor of Ti on the path
– the receipts for Ti+1 are the random numbers that the sender gener-
ated encrypted with the key KSTi+1 ; Ti sends them back to its prede-
cessor on the path
– the guarantees that Ti receives for its payment are of the form:
HSTi(r1), . . . ,HSTi(rj), where r1, . . . , ri will be the receipts for the
coins he was paid with
– {MS→Ti−1}KSTi−1 is the part of the onion message from the sender
that has to be forwarded to Ti−1. In the case when Ti is the last node
on the forwarding path, MS→Ti−1 is the message to the receiver.
After receiving its message from its predecessor, the node Ti acquires
its payment, which is verified using the guarantees received from the
sender. Then, it sends the receipts for Ti+1 to its predecessor. Next, the
node uses the values from the sender to generate payment coins for its
successor Ti−1. It adds the coins to {MS→Ti−1}KSTi−1 , signs the whole
resulting message and forwards it to its successor.
Deposit The deposit of all coins is handled by the Bank, which checks
their validity and depositability. The validity of S-coins can be checked
immediately by each node which is paid with them while the validity of A-
coins is established at the Bank that checks for double-spending. At each
deposit time the nodes deposit all coins that they have received during
the period. Detailed analysis of the deposit period is provided in a later
section. Here, we define the procedure for deposit. Coins are considered for
deposit if and only if they are accompanied by the corresponding receipt.
The valid coins will be handled in two different ways: The deposit of S-
coins is, in essence, a deposit of the underlying microcoins. This means
that only a fraction of them will become depositable [7]. All A-coins are
depositable at their nominal value.
4.3 Discussion
We preserve Tor’s anonymity by allowing each node on the path to know
only its predecessor and its successor. To this end, we harness the layered
structure of the message passed by the sender to the forwarding path and
the fact that payments are made between consecutive nodes. However, the
sender still has control of the payments made along the path by sending
the receipts used for their generation. A node that attempts to cheat can
be easily identified by its successor. Since the successor holds the receipts
for the cheater’s payment there is no incentive for the cheater to either
mangle or drop the message. Finally, Tor encryption guarantees both the
confidentiality and integrity of all transmitted messages.
5 Security Analysis
There has been a wealth of research related to attacks against onion
routing systems including Tor. Our goal is to ensure that PAR does not
introduce new types of attacks, especially ones that can target either the
anonymity or the robustness of an onion routing system. In addition, we
prove the security properties of PAR using the augmented Tor threat
model introduced earlier.
Sender-Receiver Unlinkability and Deposit Rate
We provide a formal model of information leakage of the payment
scheme that can expose anonymity when combined with known attacks
against anonymity networks. Although two differentiable types of pay-
ments are used in PAR this does not bring any higher risk than currently
exists in Tor for the identity of the senders, which can be recognized as
such if they use A-coins. The reason for this is that only nodes outside
the system are required to pay the first node in their forwarding path
with A-coins and currently lists of the relay nodes in Tor are publicly
available and therefore outside nodes using the anonymizing system can
be also recognized by the first relay that they use.
We will consider attacks that have access to the deposit information
in addition to corrupted nodes. In our payment scheme, the Bank can
be considered a global adversary since it observes the deposits of coins
made at all nodes. That is why in the analysis of possible attacks we will
speak in terms of whether the Bank can disclose any of the anonymization
that occurs in Tor’s forwarding paths, with or without cooperation from
malicious nodes.
The most serious type of attack for an anonymization network is one
that manages to link senders and receivers communicating over the net-
work. Since the senders using PAR pay with anonymous coins if they are
outside nodes, the Bank cannot identify the start of the path that they
choose to use. If the sender is a Tor node that forwards other traffic as
well, the payments for all of its own and forwarded traffic are indistin-
guishable; hence the Bank cannot trace the traffic originating at the node
just by observing deposits. The receivers are also unidentifiable by the
Bank, since there is no monetary transaction between the last node and
the receiver.
We have shown that the Bank by itself cannot link sender and receiver.
Now we must consider the question whether an adversary observing the
deposits can obtain partial information about a forwarding path by dis-
covering three consecutive inside nodes in the path, i.e., being able to
guess to where a node forwards packets received from a particular prede-
cessor. Consecutive nodes in a path can be inferred from the signed coins
deposits, but the only thing that this means is that there is at least one
path that has that pair; nothing more is learned about which connection
this path serves.
For the purposes our analysis let cpT,T˜ ,i<T`,...,T1> be the packets transferred
on a connection path such that T = Ti and T˜ = Ti−1. We denote the
packets on all connection paths that have T˜ as a successor of T by
C(T, T˜ ) = {cpT,T˜ ,i<Til ,...,Ti1>|1 < i ≤ `}.
Then the number of coins that a node T˜ will receive from T will be
G(T, T˜ ) =
∑
∀cpT,T˜ ,i<T`,...,T1>∈C(T,T˜ )
i ∗ cT,T˜ ,i<T`,...,T1>.
If we denote the number of anonymous coins that a node T deposits with
Gac(T ), we can calculate the number of packets forwarded by T (assuming
that a node is paid with one coin for each packet forwarded):∑
T ′




In order to hide the exact number of packets that it has forwarded, a
node can deposit some of its own anonymous coins; thus the above ex-
pression will no longer be a correct estimate. Not knowing the rate of
packet transfer nor the number of connections in which two nodes are
consecutive, an adversary cannot receive enough information just from
the deposits of coins to determine three consecutive nodes in a path.
Let us now assume that there is a malicious node that colludes with
the Bank in order to reveal more about a path. The malicious node can
disclose his predecessor and his successor on a particular connection path,
as well as his position in that path. Let T = Ti be such a malicious node
in the path T`, . . . , T1. Now the adversary can find out who are the nodes
Ti+1 and Ti−1 and the number of packets k that Ti forwarded on that
connection. The only thing that it can infer about the identities of Ti+2
and Ti−2 is that if
(i− 1) ∗ k > G(Ti−1, T˜ ) (1)
then the node T˜ cannot be a successor of Ti−1 and similarly if
(i+ 1) ∗ k > G(T˜ , Ti+1) (2)
T˜ cannot be a predecessor of Ti+1. This is true only if we assume that the
connections among different nodes have the same forwarding rate. Thus
the chance of the adversary finding out anything more about the path
than what it would have found out from a malicious node in Tor without
any payments is very small.
In the discussion above we have made an implicit assumption that the
deposits of coins occur at certain intervals during which enough connec-
tions have been established. The statement “enough connections” means
that there are no cases where only one node deposits another node’s signed
coins and it is clearly its successor in any connection. Also, we minimize
the probability of Eq. 1 or Eq. 2 being true.
Deposit Rate Now we give an estimate of what we consider “enough”
connections and packets transferred during a deposit period. The situa-
tion in which an adversary may eliminate a link between two Tor nodes as
being part of the path transferring the packets on a particular connection
is when the payments made for that link are not enough for the packets
that were expected to be sent on the connection. To avoid such situa-
tion, we want the expected payments made for packets forwarded along
a link between any nodes during a deposit period to exceed the expected
payment for the packets forwarded on a single connection.
Let us assume that there are N packets sent across a network con-
sisting of n nodes over C connections during a deposit interval. Let L be
the average length of the forwarding path. Then since the probability of
a node being in any position on the path is 1n , the expected payment that
a node will get per packet sent over PAR will be
1
n
(1 + . . .+ L) =
L ∗ (L+ 1)
2n
Now considering that every node will forward on average Nn packets, a
node will be paid N∗L∗(L+1)
2n2
, which distributed across the n − 1 edges
going out of it yields N∗L∗(L+1)
2n2∗(n−1) payment per edge. At the same time the
average payment made for the packets on a connection is N∗L∗(L+1)2C .
We observe that for
N ∗ L ∗ (L+ 1)
2n2 ∗ (n− 1) >
N ∗ L ∗ (L+ 1)
2C
to hold, we need O(n3) connections across the whole network or an aver-
age of O(n2) connections per node. We stress that with so many connec-
tions, an adversary would not be able to eliminate even a single possible
path route for a given connection. If we now consider the situation when
the adversary can narrow the possible successors of a particular node
down to some number nc, there are still n`c possible paths for the connec-
tion. However in this case we would want
N ∗ L ∗ (L+ 1)
2n2 ∗ nc >
N ∗ L ∗ (L+ 1)
2C
and we will need a total of O(n2) connections across the network or O(n)
per node.
In previous discussion we mentioned that each node may deposit some
of its own anonymous coins to provide more anonymity of the traffic
it is forwarding. We now point out that by having each node deposit
anonymous coins we will additionally disguise the entry points for outside
traffic being forwarded in the network. Since the ratio of anonymous and
signed coins in the payment scheme is 2L−1 , to preserve this ratio across
all nodes each node should add its own anonymous coins to maintain the
same deposit ratio.
Usable Efficiency The efficiency of our payment scheme is compa-
rable to that of micropayments [7,19]: the majority of the payment coins
in our system are signed coins based on microcoins with the additions
of receipts. These are much more efficient than ecash [6], which requires
zero knowledge proofs. (Even our anonymous coins are lightweight blind
signatures.)
Accountability The accountability property requires that the iden-
tity of a node that behaves maliciously – double-spending, forging at-
tempts, message manipulation, etc. – will be revealed along with a proof
of his guilt.
No node can tamper with the forwarded onion message since it is
protected with layers of encryption that can be opened only in the corre-
sponding order. Thus any attempt for forgery will be exposed by its suc-
cessor. In addition, no double spending is possible for S-coin payments.
Each of the coins is a signature by the spender; furthermore, it specifies
the receiver and the payment details.
Double spending for anonymous coins is possible and can only be
detected at deposit procedure. However, messages containing A-coins,
contain also signed hashes of the coins, which serve as proof of A-coins’
origin if a double-spending has occurred. Thus, the nodes paid with the
same coin have an proof for the misbehavior.
There is an issue of whether maintaining logs of coin related message
exchanges is necessary after coins’ deposit for satisfying accountability in
our system. Indeed, keeping some A-coin/S-coin related logs is required
to detect malicious actions by the spender/payee; In particular Bank is
required to keep a log of the serial numbers of the A-coins that have been
deposited so far and as well as the biggest serial number of S-coins each
pair of peers has exchanged. The A-coins exchanges are required to be
maintained for detecting the double-spender but only for the time of one
deposit period.
Thus far, we have showed that our payment scheme abides by its
design principles. We now prove that it still satisfies properties common
for any viable payment scheme.
Correctness When all participants act honestly and follow the pro-
tocol, our payment scheme fulfills its goals: all packets are delivered, the
nodes on the forwarding path are paid, and the anonymity of the sender
and receiver is maintained. If all nodes properly forward the onion mes-
sage that is initiated by the sender it is guaranteed to reach its receiver
because each forwarding node knows where exactly to send it. According
to the payment scheme, each node receives exactly one coin more than
it has to pay its successor per packet. Thus all nodes are paid equally
for their service. We have already shown that payments observed by the
Bank are not enough to compromise the anonymity of the identities of
sender and receiver.
Robustness Robustness refers to the probability that the path chosen
by the sender will be secure in the presence of malicious parties in the
network. Let us assume that the fraction of malicious nodes is α. Then
the probability that there is no malicious node on a path of length l is
(1 − α)l. The computed probability, however, is important for the case
when we assume that a malicious mode on the path prevents the traffic,
i.e. it drops or misdirects it. This also holds in Tor with no payments.
Now we restrict our attention to malicious nodes only in the context of
the payment system, i.e. nodes that may expose the connections going
through them and the corresponding payments for them. Based on our
analysis showing that a node acting in this malicious way can disclose
its predecessor and successor in the forwarding path, at least half of the
nodes on a path will have to be malicious in order to expose the identities
of sender and receiver. Thus the probability of preserving the anonymity
of sender and receiver over a path of length l is (1− α)l/2.
Monetary Unforgeability No coin forgery is possible in the pay-
ment scheme since both types of coins are protected with signatures.
Signed coins contain personal signatures of the payer; anonymous coins
contain the Bank’s signatures.
6 System Performance Evaluation
In this section, we quantify the computational overhead added to Tor
by our payment scheme. We execute the openssl speed command 1000
times and compute the average estimated running time of blind and digi-
tal signatures (RSA), and symmetric key encryption and hashes (SHA1).
We will focus on the overhead imposed on the communication initiator S
as well as on a random path node Ti.
We define ch to be the cost of a hash function, ce the cost of a symmet-
ric encryption procedure, and cs(cbs) and cvs(cbvs) the (blind) signature
and (blind) signature verification cost. For 1024 byte messages hashed
with SHA1, ch = 0.0045 milliseconds. For CBC DES encryption8 in blocks
of 256 bytes and RSA signature and verification in blocks of 1024 bytes
the estimated running times are ce = 0.020, cs = 3.361, and csv = 0.142
milliseconds. Assume a path of length L. For each payment round, S has
to generate L receipts for the required A-mcoins and have them blindly
signed by the Bank, and symmetrically encrypt the A-mcoins’ receipts
with KSTL−1 . In addition, S should calculate the content of S-mcoins
that each path node Ti will pay its successor Ti−1, and encrypt the re-
ceipts with KSTi−1 key. Thus the overall computational cost for S for each
payment round would be:
CostS = L ∗ (cbs + ch + ce) + L ∗ (L− 1)2 ∗ (ch + ce)
For the usual case of L = 4, CostS averages to 14.24 milliseconds overall,
or to 1.4 milliseconds per coin to be paid.
On the other hand, each node Ti in the path, should create i − 1 for
Ti−1’s S-mcoins and verify the validity of S-mcoins it received by Ti+1
8 We used DES for our tests, precisely because it is slower than AES; we wished to
set a lower bound on performance.
(signature verification and receipt):
CostTi = i ∗ (cvs + ch) + (i− 1) ∗ cs
In this case Ti will have to spend 0.045 milliseconds for each coin it gets
payed and 3.36 milliseconds for each coin it pays.
The performance impact of our scheme is dominated by two factors:
the path length and the number of packets per payment. However, the two
have very different properties. The number of packets per payment, N ,
represents the tradeoff between performance and risk. By setting N high,
the total cost of our scheme is minimized, since the expense is amortized
over a large number of transmissions. However, N also represents how
willing nodes are to transmit packets without assurance of payment. If N
is too high, a cheater can send a fair amount of data before being caught.
Minimizing that risk requires setting N low, and hence increasing the
cost.
7 Related Work
Previous research on applying payments in anonymizing networks was
focused on mixnets: Franz, et al [10], Figueiredo et al. [11] and Reiter et
al. [12] all use a blind signature type of electronic cash to induce mixes to
operate honestly. The approach of Franz et al. divides electronic payment
and messages into small chunks and allows mixes and users to do the
exchange step-by-step, which made the resulting system extremely ineffi-
cient. Furthermore, the receiver is required to participate in the payment
procedure, which is undesirable: the receiver may not know or care about
Tor. Figueiredo provided a completely anonymous payment system for
mixnets, but without any accountability and robustness. Reiter et al. pro-
posed a fair exchange protocol for connection-based and message-based
mixnets. However, their protocol assumes that mixes would work prop-
erly to receive their payment after they commit to their service. They
do not provide any guarantee that participants will indeed get paid be-
yond the fact that the initiator will have no reason for not paying them.
Furthermore, computationally expensive oﬄine zero knowledge computa-
tions are required in the case of a message-based mixnet protocol [20],
which renders the system inefficient and thus currently non-deployable.
8 Conclusions
Current anonymity networks appear to lack wide participation due to
their volunteer nature. We posit that by providing economic incentives,
we can help incentivize users to both participate and to use anonymity
networks to protect their communications. Unfortunately, current pay-
ment schemes cannot be used to enable payments in Tor. To address this,
we introduce a novel hybrid scheme and prove that it is possible to add
a secure payment scheme to an onion-based anonymity network. Our ap-
proach combines features of existing payment schemes in an innovative
way, achieving provable sender-receiver unlinkability, accountability and
efficiency at the same time.
Furthermore, we relate the anonymity of the overall architecture to
the amount of traffic that has been forwarded through the network and
the number of Tor relays. To avoid exposure, we provide initial lower-
bound on the minimum payment deposit time required. Additionally –
and similar to Tor – it appears that longer paths have a higher risk of
including malicious nodes that may try to expose sender and receiver. On
the other hand, shorter paths are more robust, incurring lower communi-
cation and computation overhead. These two limitations, namely the path
length and the presence of malicious nodes, are also part of the underly-
ing Tor network and reasonable parameters for the scheme can minimize
their effect. Finally, a preliminary evaluation of our scheme indicates that
PAR does not incur prohibitive communication and computational costs
that could prevent its practical deployment.
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